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"ff Men Were Angels":
The Normative Role of Schools in Fostering Civic Virtue

by
William M. Bryner
The April 1992 riots in Los Angeles, California reemphasized a decline in the American
social environment and highlighted the need for new methods by which to remedy this
degradation. For a solution to this problem, this paper looks to the Founding Fathers'
conception of civic virtue, the voluntary moderation of one's self-interest for the good of the
community. Further, a functional rethinking of the role of public schools is set forth in
which schools playa key role in fostering civic virtue. Finally, a moderate reform of
constitutional adjudication is proposed which would enable public schools to more adequately
accomplish this task.

I. Introduction

The title of this essay conveys a special
and perhaps ironic significance in modem
American society. The phrase, first employed by James Madison (writing under
the pen name Publius) in Federalist, Number 51 ("If men were angels, no government would be necessary" [Hamilton, Jay,
and Madison 1987, 281])1 inspires two key
observations. First, simply put, men are
not angels, as the very existence of government testifies. Second, because of this,
one of the necessary functions of government is to guard against man's imperfections. Angels presumably require no
supreme authority to ensure adherence to
law; they are entirely self-governing.
Error-prone humans, on the other hand, do
require just such an authority.
The tragic 1992 riots in Los Angeles
have added a fresh meaning to Madison's
words. Perhaps no other event in recent
years has verified Madison's statement
more than the spirit of anarchy which
overtook and ruled that city before government could restore order. Nowhere were
man's "less-than-angelic" qualities more

evident than in the city whose name literally means "The Angels. "
The Los Angeles incident raises the
question: What can be done to prevent
such a situation from recurring? This
essay will attempt to answer this question
by constructing a theoretical framework
within which many of the ills of the sociopolitical environment would be abated. As
the subtitle indicates, the essay will look to
the normative power of schools as an
instrument to nourish the civic virtue upon
which American political institutions rest.
This thesis--that schools can and must
playa key role in fostering civic virtue if
the social condition is to improve--provides the essay's basic structure. Part II
will attempt to define civic virtue and
emphasize its primacy in the American
Founding. Part III will then analyze the
special potential of schools, assess their
unique position which makes them key
actors in encouraging virtue, and suggest
some specific measures which ought to be
considered to enable schools to reach their
normative potential. Part IV will offer
some general conclusions arising from this
discussion.
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One important caution must be offered
before commencing. This essay does not
advocate an approach that fits perfectly
within the current conception of the American political structure. Instead, it deemphasizes the positive (what is) and focuses
primarily upon the normative (what ought
to be). If the events in Los Angeles teach
nothing else, they unequivocally indicate
that change of some sort is not simply a
good idea, but a political necessity. Thus,
this approach requires a rethinking of
certain positions as well as some accommodations by several parties; yet the price
to pay is a minimal one if the nation is
serious about improving its social environment.

ll. Civic Virtue and the American
Founding
The term "founding" captures the
essence of our nation's beginnings. "To
found" means principally "to lay the base
of' something (Guralnik and Friend 1968).
In the political sense, the American
Founding refers to the way in which the
"Founding Fathers" (men such as James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Benjamin
Franklin, and others) "laid the base of' the
American form of government, particularly
the Constitution. Yet, a "founding" implies a "foundation," or a set of basic
principles upon which the superstructure
rests. As Professor Martin Diamond has
indicated:
... foundation must be understood quite literally:
American institutions rest upon it. Those who wish
to improve American life ... must base such improvement upon the American foundation; and this
means to come to terms with the "policy" that is an
essential part of that foundation. (1986, 95)

This section of the essay will explore
civic virtue as a foundational concept for
American society. Indeed, virtue was "a
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theme that was paramount at the time of
the American Founding but . . . has since
receded from public discourse" (Pangle
1987, 105). It represents the very principle whose absence the Founders believed
would doom the American republic to
government by "accident and force" instead of by "reflection and choice" (1.2).
A. From Aristotle to America: Civic
Virtue Defined
In order to grasp the core of civic
virtue in America, one must return to
Aristotle's concept of what constitutes
virtue. Aristotle argued that "moral virtue
... is a mean between two vices, one
involving excess and the other deficiency"
(1963, 41). Thus, the excesses or deficiencies of attributes were considered vices
and opposed to one another; but the mean
between the two poles opposed both ends
and defined virtue. For example, the
classic virtue of courage rested at the mean
between the vices of cowardice (a deficiency) and recklessness (an excess). In
Aristotle's view, "a master of any art or
craft shuns excess and defect, but seeks
the intermediate and chooses it" (34).
Virtue can therefore be viewed as a continuum, and the closer to the midpoint an
individual is, the more virtuous that individual will be.
Admittedly, Aristotle and the American
Founders differed on many issues, particularly the role of virtue in the polis. For
instance, Aristotle saw virtue as the ultimate end for which government existed; to
the contrary, the Founders viewed it as a
useful means toward good government
(Pangle 1987, 110). Nevertheless, the
Aristotelian concept of virtue as the midpoint between two poles will be an invaluable component and a recurring theme
throughout the remainder of this essay.
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Throughout The Federalist, Publius
echoes this same sentiment under the title
of "moderation." In fact, moderation, or
the willingness to compromise and move
toward the "middle," provides the latent
framework of this commentary on the
Constitution. In Number One, Publius
contends that:
... we, upon many occasions, see wise and good
men on the wrong as well as the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of
moderation to those who are ever so much persuaded
of their being in the right in any controversy. (1.7;
emphasis added)

Later, we find him lamenting "that public
measures are rarely investigated with that
spirit of moderation which is essential to a
just estimate of their real tendency to
advance or obstruct the public good"
(37.2; emphasis added). Finally, he asserts that the "judicious reflections" of The
Federalist in themselves "contain a lesson
of moderation" (85.18; emphasis added) to
those who read them. For example, that
Madison and Hamilton, who disagreed
greatly on the nature and extent of national
power, could set aside their differences to
corroborate in writing The Federalist is
just such a lesson of moderation.
Aristotle's concept of virtue as a mean
and Publius' extolment of moderation are
particularly useful in understanding the
metamorphosis of ancient virtue to modern
American virtue. Richard Vetterli and
Gary Bryner, in their comprehensive study
of virtue and the American Founding,
contend that American civic virtue is
essentially a synthesis of the classical
virtues (courage, moderation, justice, and
wisdom) and the Pauline virtues (faith,
hope, charity, and benevolence). Thus,
while "[classical] civic virtue ... meant
the patriotic subordination of one's person-
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al interests to the common welfare" (1987,
20) and the Judeo-Christian virtues dictated that "[people] were to be motivated by
a sincere interest and love for others"
(1987, 4), what they call "a modem republican virtue" (1987, 4; emphasis added)
rested somewhere between the two.
American civic virtue, then, can be
seen as the Aristotelian mean between the
classical and Pauline poles of virtue, and
contains three key components. First,
virtuous citizens must, when necessary,
temper their individual self-interest when it
threatens the public order. Second, virtuous citizens must practice something akin
to the biblical Golden Rule, being motivated by a benevolent concern for others
(Vetterli and Bryner 1987, 50). Finally,
"their ... self-interest [must] be voluntarily channeled and constrained" (4;
emphasis added); government should not
take an active role in compelling citizens
to be virtuous. In a certain sense, American civic virtue is nothing more than the
practical application of Publius' "moderation. "
B. "How Firm a Foundation?": The Need

for Civic Virtue in a Republic
This concept of civic virtue--restriction
of individual self-interest when it threatens
public order, benevolence toward others,
and a voluntary undertaking of these-provides the essential groundwork upon
which American institutions rest. In framing the American system of government,
the Founders necessarily assumed that
these characteristics existed in sufficient
measure to provide a firm foundation for
the repUblic. Simply put, they believed
that republican government presupposed a
moderately virtuous people.
Publius preceded his aforementioned
statement concerning men, angels, and
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government with a significant rhetorical
question which ultimately guided the
Founding: "But what is government itself,
but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature?" (5l.6). If government mirrors
the natural characteristics of its citizenry,
then to attempt to found a government that
is inconsistent with human nature is an
exercise in futility. Thus, the Founders'
first step was to evaluate the nature of
man.
In this assessment of man, the Founders again took the moderate course, adopting a realistic view of man's potential.
Individually, man was "ambitious, vindictive, ... rapacious" (6.2), possessed an
"ordinary depravity" (57.16), and often
allowed "the clamors of an impatient
avidity for immediate and immoderate
gain" to suppress "the mild voice of reason" (42.11). In collective bodies, men
were not much better. They would often
engage in "improprieties and excesses, for
which they would blush in a private capacity" (15.15) and would often sacrifice "the
great interests of society . . . to the vanity,
to the conceit, and to the obstinacy of
individuals" (70.12). Clearly, men were
not angels; if they were, "no government
would be necessary" (5l.6).
Publius' grim realism concerning the
nature of man must, however, be tempered
in order for free government to succeed.
Indeed, readers of The Federalist are
counseled "to view human nature as it is,
without either flattering its virtues or
exaggerating its vices" (76.11). While it
is true that "there is a degree of depravity
in mankind which requires a certain degree
of circumspection and distrust," it is also
true that "there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion
of esteem and confidence" (55.15). Thus,
the Founders held a moderate view of
human psychology, seeing man as an
amalgam of both "good" and "evil."
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Such a view of humanity acted as an
important catalyst for the structure of
government which emerged from Philadelphia. Publius saw "[a] dependence on the
people" as "the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught
mankind the necessity of auxiliary [meaning secondary and supporting] precautions"
(5l.7; emphasis added) to protect against
man's shortcomings. Moreover, while it
was "evident that no other form [than a
republican government] would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of
America [its character and nature]" (39.2),
it was also true that "[republican] government presupposes the existence of these
[virtuous] qualities in a higher degree than
any other form" (55.15). Ultimately, selfgovernment "[implied], that there is a
portion of virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence" (76.11; emphasis
added).
Two salient points emerge from this
discussion. First, the institutional arrangements embodied in the American Constitution require a moderately virtuous citizenry. The Founders were emphatic in stressing this necessity. Publius argued that if
"there is not sufficient virtue among men
for self-government," then, "nothing less
than the chains of despotism can restrain
them from destroying and devouring one
another" (55.15). Later, Madison asked in
the Virginia State Ratifying Convention:
Is there no virtue among us? If there be not, we are
in a wretched situation. No theoretical checks, no
form of government, can render us secure. To
suppose that any form of government will secure
liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people
is a chimerical idea. (McClellan 1989, 280)

Other Founders also supported this position (Vettedi and Bryner 1987, 69-71).
Second, while not glorifying man, the
Founders evidently believed that the Amer-
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icans of 1787 possessed sufficient civic
virtue to make republican government
work. Were Americans without government as naturally corrupt as Hobbes saw
them, then only a despotic sovereign of the
Hobbesian order would be able to control
them (Hobbes 1968). Conversely, "[it]
men were angels, no government would be
necessary" (51.6). Instead, the Founders
based American institutions upon a moderately virtuous citizenry. Without a sufficient degree of civic virtue, the republican
structure would ultimately crumble.
At this point, the principal question
which remains to be answered is how civic
virtue can be perpetuated from generation
to generation. In opposing the Constitution, the Anti-Federalists argued that civic
virtue would actually be undermined in the
extended, commercial republic that the
Constitution established. Instead, they
contended that only an "intimate government" (McDowell 1987, 127) "over a
relatively small territory with a homogeneous population" (Storing 1981, 15)
would be conducive to virtue. The national government would simply be too distant
to foster effectively the virtuous citizens
who would voluntarily restrain their selfinterest for the good of the republic.
The supporters of the Constitution
were in qualified agreement. The extended national government was a political
necessity to check the evil nature of man,
to control the effects of factions (see The
Federalist, Number 10), and to allow
"[ambition] ... to counteract ambition"
(51.6). However, virtue would instead be
fostered by "primary institutions" (Vetterli
and Bryner 1987, 52) or "private associations" (Brown 1987, 39) at the state and
local level. In fact, if "the state [assumed]
the primary directive role" in inculcating
virtue "through indoctrination and propaganda, . . . it [would] be unable to count

upon the genuine spontaneous response of
its people over time," and would be
obliged "to resort to a high level of administrative direction of society and greater
degrees of force and coercion" (Vetterli
and Bryner 1987, 53) if public order was
to continue. Thus, while the national
government was a negative political necessity, local institutions were to playa positive role in fostering the requisite virtue in
the citizenry.
This discussion's impact on the current
sociopolitical environment should be clear:
this foundational aspect of American republicanism has changed little since 1787.
A sufficient degree of civic virtue--the
voluntary moderation of individual selfinterest for the good of others and of
society--is still a prerequisite to political
success. Events of the last few decades,
with the Los Angeles incident being only
the most recent, have heightened the need
to reemphasize the importance of civic
virtue and develop ways to generate it.
How might this discussion help to
prevent another situation similar to Los
Angeles? In examining the riots, it was
evident that the most damage was done by
completely self-interested individuals who
felt no need (nor desire) to moderate their
passions for the sake of public order. In
short, such an episode would never have
occurred among citizens possessing a
moderate degree of civic virtue. Civic
virtue, then, represents the fundamental
control against such destructive behavior.

m.

Schools as Promoters of Civic
Virtue

Whether they are known as "primary
institutions" (Vetterli and Bryner 1987,
52), "private associations" (Brown 1987,
39), or some other title, families, schools,
churches, neighborhoods, and other local
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structures carry the principal responsibility
for fostering civic virtue. Because of their
direct contact with citizens in their formative years, schools in particular can play a
unique role in transgenerationally nourishing virtue. Unfortunately, the teaching in
public schools of those values which constitute civic virtue has recently fallen into
disrepute (Bauer 1986, 24-27; Cannon
1981, 3-7; Hafen 1987, 677-695; Janowitz
1983, ix-xiv; Wildavsky 1991, 46-54).
This section will seek to accomplish
three objectives: (1) to examine objections
to teaching the values inherent in civic
virtue, (2) to submit a functional rethinking of the school's role in American government, and (3) to propose some recommendations that will allow schools to more
fully reach their normative potential. This
reevaluation and its subsequent solutions
will be founded upon the principle of
moderation outlined in Part II.

cannot be verified by empirical testing
(Bauer 1986, 24; Bohn 1990).
Underlying all objections, however, is
the belief that teaching values is somehow
inimical to the First Amendment, particularly the guarantee of freedom of speech
and the protection against the establishment of religion. Efforts at moral education, critics contend, inhibit students' free
expression (Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser 1986), simply reflect tenets of
the Judeo-Christian ethic (Bauer 1986, 2425; Wildavsky 1991, 47), or both. Invariably, opponents of moral education focus
upon individual constitutional rights (a
topic which will be taken up in Part
III.C.). By doing so, they almost automatically look to the courts for a remedy.

A. Objections to Moral Education

Any legal opposition to moral education that is rooted in individual rights must
inevitably focus upon constitutional language, namely, "Congress shall make no
law ... " (Amendment I; emphasis added); and " ... nor shall any State . .. "
deny any person due process of law or
equal protection of the laws (Amendment
XIV, Section 1; emphasis added). Within
this framework, the Supreme Court has
recognized an "essential dichotomy" between public and private acts (Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks 1978, 165). Currently, the
public-private dichotomy is an all or nothing proposition: if state action is involved,
the courts balance the individual rights and
government interests involved and render a
decision; if the act is private, there is no
constitutional limitation and the individual
has no recourse (Worthen 1991, 1306).
While determining what exactly constitutes
state action can be difficult--for example,
actions by a private restaurant leasing its

American civic virtue is, by its nature
and definition, value-laden. While teaching the mechanics of American government is a necessary component of nourishing civic virtue, independently it is not a
sufficient aspect. Indeed, "the action of
one person toward another" is "the central
concern of morality" (Heslep 1989, 15).
Thus, inculcating civic virtue inherently
involves a type of values (or moral) education.
Opponents of moral education object to
it on several grounds. Many commonly
respond, "'Whose morals are you going to
teach?'" (Etzioni 1991, 9); others contend
that certain values (Le., sexual restraint,
abstention from drug use, and others) are
not as "valuable" as traditionally believed
(Bauer 1986, 24); and some argue that
values are intrinsically subjective and

B. Rethinking the Public-Private
Dichotomy: Schools as Mediating
Institutions
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building from a state agency (Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority 1974) and
court enforcement of a private property
agreement which discriminates based upon
race (Shelley v. Kraemer 1948) are both
considered state action; acts of a utility
company operating under a state-granted
monopoly (Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co. 1974) are not--the Court has consistently held that actions by public schools
are considered state action (West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943;
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 1969; Everson v.
Board of Education 1947; and many others) and that public school teachers perform a government function (Ambach v.
Nonvick 1979).
By employing this formal framework,
the Court is forced to emphasize the dichotomous poles and somehow to draw a
line between public, government institutions and private ones. Within this structure, government institutions--including
public schools--cannot (and should not)
impose value systems upon their members
because, as mentioned earlier, to do so
would preclude a voluntary reaction of the
citizens and would necessitate a greater
degree of government coercion to obtain
the desired response (Vetterli and Bryner
1987, 53). Therefore, within the publicprivate dichotomy, such actions are appropriately left entirely to the "private" realm.
The difficulty, however, is that the
Court has concurrently recognized the
special importance of education as "the
very foundation of good citizenship"
(Brown v. Board of Education 1954, 493).
Moreover, "a State properly may regard
all teachers as having an obligation to
promote civic virtues and understanding in
their classes" (Ambach v. Nonvick 1979,
80; emphasis added). Within the polar
pUblic-private framework, it seems contra-
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dictory to see public schools as promoters
of civic virtue (a "private" function) and
as a "function of state and local governments" (an obviously "public" task)
(Brown v. Board of Education 1954, 493).
Though referring specifically to the
normative power of cities and Indian
tribes, Brigham Young University law
professor Kevin J Worthen2 has proposed a
resolution to this conflict by advocating a
Figure 1. Normative Role of Various American
Institutions.
Organization
I.

The Family

2.

Private Voluntary
Organizations (social
clubs, churches, etc.)

3.

Public Schools

4.

Nonconstitutional
Governmenta (cities,
Indian tribes, etc.)

5.

Federal Government

Normative Role
High

Moderate

Low

perspective akin to the Aristotelian mean.
He argues:
The extent to which modern American organizations
are morally justified in imposing norms on their
members can be plotted on a continuum. More
voluntary organizations, such as purely social clubs,
are at one extreme of the continuum, and the federal
government is at the other. States are close to the
federal government extreme of the continuum, but do
not reach it because one can more easily switch states
than countries. Local governments, while closer to
the states than social clubs, nonetheless fall more to
the voluntary side of the continuum than do state
governments. Thus, some group value decisions are
more appropriate for local governments than for
either the federal or state governments. (1991, 1286)
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As "public intermediary institutions"
(Worthen 1991, 1290), standing between
the individual and the state, local governments can playa role in giving "meaningful voice to disparate value systems"
(Worthen 1991, 1312) and fostering civic
virtue.
Bruce Hafen, former dean of the
Brigham Young University School of Law,
points out that public schools, like local
governments, possess the unique ability to
act as "mediating institutions." Hafen
argues that, traditionally, "schools have
been, at times quite literally, in loco parentis: in the place of the parents" (1987,
673). As an extension of the family,
schools were called upon to reinforce the
values fostered in the home. Indeed, "the
traditional commitment of the schools to
teach children such civic and moral virtues
as integrity, cooperation, self-reliance, and
responsibility remains central to the task of
public education" (700).
Nevertheless, Hafen asserts that since
Brown v. Board of Education "called upon
the public schools to assume the role of
direct state agents in the desegregation of
society" (674), schools have moved "even
further from the localized world of home
and family toward the nationalized world
of federal policy" (1987, 674). Within the
public-private dichotomy, in the last halfcentury the courts have moved schools
firmly onto the public side.
From the perspective of Worthen's
functional continuum, however, the Supreme Court has placed public schools
somewhere between local governments and
purely private organizations. In its 1973
decision in San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez, the Court held that local control over education is a legitimate government interest which can rationally justify
certain inequalities in funding public
schools. Earlier, in Wright v. Council of
City of Emporia, both the majority and
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dissenting opinions recognized the vital
importance of local control of education
(1972, 469, 478). Finally, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder (1972), the Court acknowledged the
critical, role parents play in assessing their
children's educational needs and interests,
and that such decisions are a matter of
individual and family privacy.
In light of these rulings, Worthen's
original continuum, extended to its fullest
degree, would yield something similar to
Figure 1. As mediating institutions,
schools and local governments fall at the
midpoint--the Aristotelian mean--between
the federal government and the family.
Consequently, schools and local governments, possessing a moderate normative
role, are uniquely suited to promote the
moderate degree of civic virtue necessary
to preserve the political system. With the
continued weakening of the American
family, the normative function of schools
becomes that much more important.
Ultimately, it is in the public schools
where both the Federalist and Anti-Federalist positions converge to make American
republicanism possible. Because of the
relative homogeneity of schools (Worthen
1991, 1294), they can easily "function as
'little republics' --tiny communities of
learning in which all participants have the
interactive opportunity . . . of developing
those 'habits of the heart' without which
there is no larger community" (Hafen
1987, 701; emphasis added). Thus, encouraging schools to function as "small
republics" fulfills the Anti-Federalist vision of intimate government and makes the
Federalist objective of effective government possible (McDowell 1987, 127).
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C. The Other Two "R's":
Schools as "Moderators" Between Rights
and Responsibilities
In addition to teaching the original
three "R's"--"reading, 'riting, and 'rithmetic" --schools also must perform the
special task of instructing students in two
other "R's": rights and responsibilities.
Schools, however, have followed the
modem trend of "[enhancing] citizen rights
without effective articulation of citizen
obligations" (Janowitz 1983, ix). Such a
propensity has inevitably shifted the balance toward the federal government end of
the spectrum, a move ill-suited to the
promotion of civic virtue.
The philosophical liberalism which
imbues the language of rights is based
upon a key assumption. As illustrated by
Michael J. Sandel (1984), in its purest
form, the liberal view of rights presumes
that there is no overarching purpose or end
to any action; "the good" is simply nonexistent. Instead, the grounding principle is
the absence of any higher end prior to
rights: the right precedes the good. In
short, Sandel contends, "what matters
above all. . . are not the ends we choose
but our capacity to choose them" (1984,
86).
Values clarification, the approach to
moral education currently in vogue
(Wildavsky 1991, 46-47; Bauer 1986, 2425; Heslep 1989, 183-86), and the "behavioralization" of social studies (Janowitz
1981, 145-52) both echo these assumptions
of liberalism. Values clarification denies
any preset collection of ethics which
should guide individual behavior; instead,
it privileges the students' abilities to make
their own normative decisions. Teachers
simply ensure that students' ethical choices
are internally consistent. The behavioral
approach to social science assumes that
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people are simply objects in motion who
can be understood only through empiricism
because there is no volition guiding individual action.
While appealing, in this form the
liberal view of rights--with its corollaries
of values clarification and behaviorism--is
significantly flawed. It ignores the sharing
of traditions and community necessary in a
world where no individual is self-sufficient. Thus, "[denied] the expansive selfunderstandings that could shape a common
life, the liberal self is left to lurch between
detachment on the one hand, and entanglement on the other" (Sandel 1984, 91). At
its highest, the language of rights permits
no meaningful interaction with others,
interaction which dependent individuals
require. Ironically, this autonomy, taken
to its extreme, destroys even the rights
upon which it is grounded; of what benefit, for instance, is freedom of expression
without an audience or forum--a community--in which to express one's views?
Robert J. Nash and Robert S. Griffin
aptly summarized this position:
If individuals are only what they choose to be, if they
can detach themselves from social and historical roles
at will, if they can ignore their embedded ness in those
traditions from which they derive identity, and if
there is no telos to give life direction and purpose,
then society is little more than a collection of strangers, bereft of community and tradition, each pursuing
private interests with no restraints or sense of transcendence. We believe that this is the sum and

substance of a life without a sense of civic virtue.
(1987, 561; emphasis added)

As has been true throughout this essay,
the fullest value to both individual rights
and community sharing can be found at the
midpoint between these two ideals. This
requires that rights be tempered and balanced with responsibilities. Schools and
local governments are both tailored to
strike that balance, to teach students effec-
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tively the "lesson of moderation" (1.7)
which Publius envisioned. Returning to
Professor Worthen's continuum, at one
end, families and voluntary private organizations can be seen as promoters of responsibility; at the other, the federal and
state governments take on the role of
protectors of rights. Schools and local
governments, once again, lie in the middle
and provide the best opportunity for the
rights and responsibilities necessary for
republican government to coalesce and
thrive. With the continuing disintegration
of the family, even more of the weight for
promoting responsibility falls upon schools
and local governments.
Values clarification and behavioralism,
however, only serve to place further
weight on the rights side of the scale,
altogether ignoring the requisite responsibilities (Janowitz 1983, 146). Unless
measures are taken to restore the necessary
balance, the deleterious effects and overemphasis of rights will continue to be felt
throughout the sociopolitical environment.
For example, speaking of the need for
greater emphasis on responsibility in race
relations, Justice Dallin H. Oaks argued,
"Instead of exploring new ways to enforce
non-discrimination rights, we might be
more effective by exploring new ways to
win hearts to the proposition that each of
us has a responsibility to treat persons on
their own merits as children of God, whatever their race, creed, color, sex, or national origin" (1985, 431; emphasis in
original). I believe the same can be said
of most other aspects of social interaction.
D. Restoring the Rights/Responsibilities
Balance: A Proposed Solution
In order to be consistent with the preceding analysis, any solution to the imbalance of rights and responsibilities must be
a moderate one, lying at the midpoint
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between unfettered, individual autonomy
and the complete, authoritarian control of
education advocated by Plato in Book V of
his Republic, where the children were
removed from the society and subjected to
rigorous paramilitary training (1980, 24486). Instead, a moderate rethinking of
constitutional adjudication would allow
schools to perform their function in fostering civic virtue.
One solution which would meet this
criterion synthesizes Worthen's proposed
approach to local governments with the
method Hafen has advanced. Worthen
(1991) points out that courts already vary
their method of decision making depending
upon the right involved--some rights (for
instance, freedom of expression) receive
more weight than others. He would
"merely authorize the same consideration
for the nature of the governmental interest" (1991, 1307). Thus, in deciding if a
right has been violated, the courts would
give additional weight to a local government or school interest involved than it
would to, say, a state government because
of the greater normative function of local
governments and schools.
Hafen's (1987) proposal, though dealing specifically with freedom of expression, could easily be applied to most
school situations involving values education. He argues that the courts should
recognize an "institutional academic freedom" (1987, 722) for public schools, in
which the decisions of educators would be
presumed valid unless they go "'beyond
the pale of reasoned academic decisionmaking'" (1987, 723; quoting Regents of
University of Michigan v. Ewing 1985,
515). In essence, he would advocate a
good faith exception for the institutional
decisions of educators. Any constitutional
challenge to values education simply must
meet a more stringent legal burden in
order for the program to be declared
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invalid. These two considerations would
return enough weight to the responsibility
side of the scale and would restore the
balance without mortally wounding individual rights.
Under this proposal, school districts,
with input from local citizens, would be
able to institute programs to teach certain
positive values, if they so decide. Values
which merely coincide with specific religious tenets would generally be permitted;
clear attempts at advancing sectarian doctrine, however, would necessarily meet a
higher standard of judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, through moderate public debate,
communities would be able to control what
values are being taught in their schools.
Such an experience in itself would be an
exercise in civic virtue, an activity in
which citizens would be able to think
through, change, and refine their opinions
for the good of community (McDowell
1987, 142). Shared values such as "honesty, justice, integrity, respect for the
environment, respect for others, respect
for self, compassion, due process, equality
of opportunity, peaceful resolution of
conflict, loyalty, responsible citizenship-and much, much more" (Wildavsky 1991,
48), as well as community meanings of
their practical applications, could be taught
and fostered. Moreover, courts would still
be able to address those cases in which
decisions have not been made in good
faith.
The ultimate result of such an approach, however, would be much greater
than simply allowing moral education in
public schools. The vices linked to the
unrestrained self-indulgence which plagues
our society--crimes of all types, pornography, irresponsible sexual promiscuity,
drug use, gambling, welfare dependence,
and many, many more--would all be reduced (Cannon 1981, 3-7; Bauer 1986,
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24). A situation such as the Los Angeles
incident--in which one perceived injustice
was compounded by hundreds, if not
thousands of others--would be much less
probable. The moderating effects of civic
virtue would restrain such individuals from
ignoring their internalized value system
and engaging in such destructive behavior.
E. Responding to the Objections
Adopting such an approach to moral
education would also effectively respond to
the aforementioned objections to teaching
values. First, the question, "Whose morals?" would no longer carry the weight it
now does. Because of our pluralistic
society, values and morals would inevitably differ from community to community.
Those who disagree with the values of the
community in which they live have the
option of either persuading others to allow
their views to be heard or relocating to a
community which shares their values.
Pluralism, instead of being stifled, would
actually be fostered and strengthened
(Worthen 1991).
Second, the current approach could withstand an Establishment Clause challenge
because it meets the judicial test set forth
in Lemon v. Kunzman (1971). The moral
education programs in the various communities have a "secular legislative purpose"
(1971, 612): promoting civic virtue and
citizenship, which the Court has already
recognized as a legitimate and crucial
function of schools. They "neither [advance] nor [inhibit] religion" (1971, 612);
and, unless academically unreasonable
measures are undertaken, they do not
"foster an excessive government entanglement with religion" (1971, 613).
Moreover, though certain religious
precepts (such as the Christian concept of
the Golden Rule) may be promoted, "the
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'Establishment' Clause does not ban federal or state regulation of conduct whose
reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some
or all religions"(McGowan v. Maryland
1960, 442).
Finally, the objection based upon the
fact-value dichotomy is fatally flawed.
Elimination of all biases and preconceptions in any mode of discourse is simply
impossible because all use of language has
been previously conditioned by individual
experience. Professor David Bohn indicates:
Because there is no unconditioned language in which
an unconditioned or objective truth could be a possibility, [postmodern philosophers Gadamer and
Ricoeurl ... recognize that the horizon of understanding or tradition of discourse within which we
actually do scholarly research could never constitute a
"free market" or be characterized as a "neutral space"
in which atemporal truth reveals itself within a
controlled language of competing theories and against
indubitable methodological criteria. For this very
reason, ... every effort to make a distinction between facts and values collapses, for values are
necessarily implicit in and a guide to every mode of
discursive activity. They are an enabling condition of
every exercise of reason. (1990, 3)

Thus, certain values will always be taught,
even if by default. The approach advocated here would simply allow a full hearing
for all value systems without precluding
those that happen to coincide, for example,
with the Judeo-Christian ethic.

IV. Conclusion
The American republic was founded
upon certain ideals and principles, concepts which gave meaning to our national
experience. Unfortunately, some of those
tenets--namely, civic virtue and modera-
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tion--have given way to a self-indulging
and polarized society in which dichotomous thinking prevails. In short, the
American foundation is firm in the middle
but very weak at the "edges" (no matter
which "edge" might be popular at the
time).
By shifting the weight of our institutions away from the center of moderation
to the outside edges, the structure of our
social institutions has begun to crumble
under the pressure. As a result, the social
environment reflects serious fault lines in
American institutions. Unless America
learns the "lesson of moderation" (1.7),
particularly concerning its public schools,
the next generation will continue to learn
lessons of self-indulgence from the mass
media, youth gangs, or other misguided
institutions. By moderating our view of
the function of public schools and allowing
them to teach that same moderation in the
form of civic virtue, we can perhaps return
to the firm foundations which our institutions presuppose. Publius makes a final,
all-important admonition which may determine our success or failure:
Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you
that the people of America, knit together as they are
by so many cords of affection, can no longer live
together as members of the same family; can no
longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual
happiness; can no longer be fellow-citizens of one
great, respectable, and flourishing empire. (14.14)

Absent some effort to strengthen those
"cords of affection" (14.14), the prospects
of an enduring American polity seem bleak
indeed.

Bryner--The Normative Role of Schools

Pi Sigma Alpha Review 24

WORKS CITED

Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
Aristotle. 1963. Aristotle's ethics. Edited and translated by John Warrington. London: J.M.
Dent & Sons Ltd.
Bauer, Gary. 1986. The moral of the story: How to teach values in the nation's classrooms.
Policy Review 38 (Fall): 24-27.
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 2159 (1986).
Bohn, David E. 1990. Pluralism at Brigham Young University. The Student Review, 13
December, 3.
Brown, David W. 1987. Civic virtue in America. National Forum 67 (Spring): 39-41.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
Cannon, Mark W. 1981. What business educators can do to help prevent crime: Teach
values. Business Education Forum 36 (December): 3-7.
Diamond, Martin. 1986. Ethics and politics: The American way. In The moral foundations of
the American republic, 3d ed., ed. Robert H. Horwitz, 75-108. Charlottesville, VA:
University Press of Virginia.
Etzioni, Amatai, ed. 1991. The responsive communitarian platform: Rights and
responsibilities. The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities 2 (Winter): 4-20.
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
Guralnik, David B., and Joseph H. Friend, eds. 1968. Webster'S new world dictionary of the
American language. Cleveland: The World Publishing Company. S.v. "found."
Hafen, Bruce C. 1987. Developing student expression through institutional authority: Public
schools as mediating structures. Ohio State Law Journal 48 (3): 663-731.
Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay, and James Madison, Jr. 1987. The Federalist. Edited by
Michael Loyd Chadwick. Springfield, VA: Global Affairs Publishing Company.

25 Pi Sigma Alpha Review

Bryner--The Normative Role of Schools

Heslep, Robert D. 1989. Education in democracy: Education's moral role in the democratic
state. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press.
Hobbes, Thomas. 1968. Leviathan. Edited by C.B. MacPherson. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
Janowitz, Morris. 1983. The reconstruction of patriotism: Education for civic consciousness.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
McClellan, James. 1989. Liberty, order, and justice. Washington, D.C.: Center for Judicial
Studies.
McDowell, Gary L. Federalism and civic virtue: The Antifederalists and the Constitution. In
How federal is the Constitution?, ed. Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Schambra, 12244. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Nash, Robert J., and Robert S. Griffin. 1987. Repairing the pUblic-private split: Excellence,
character, and civic virtue. Teachers College Record 88 (Summer): 549-66.
Oaks, Dallin H. 1985. Rights and responsibilities. Mercer Law Review 36 (Winter): 427-42.
Pangle, Thomas L. 1987. Civic virtue: The Founders' conception and the traditional
conception. In Constitutionalism and rights, ed. Gary C. Bryner and Noel B. Reynolds,
105-140. Provo, UT: Brigham Young University.
Plato. 1980. The republic. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Norwalk, CT: The Easton Press.
Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 106 S.Ct. 507 (1985).
Sandel, Michael J. 1984. The procedural republic and the unencumbered self. Political
Theory 12 (February): 81-96.
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
Storing, Herbert J. 1981. The complete Anti-Federalist. Vol. 1, What the Anti-Federalists
were for. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

Bryner--The Normative Role of Schools

Pi Sigma Alpha Review 26

Vetterli, Richard, and Gary Bryner. 1987. In search of the republic: Public virtue and the
roots of American government. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 u.S. 624 (1943).
Wildavsky, Ben. 1991. Can you not teach morality in public schools? The Responsive
Community: Rights and Responsibilities 2 (Winter): 46-54.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Worthen, Kevin J. 1991. Two sides of the same coin: The potential normative power of
American cities and Indian tribes. Vanderbilt Law Review 44 (November): 1273-1312.
Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
NOTES

1.

All subsequent references to The Federalist will be given parenthetically by number and
paragraph, according to the 1987 edition, edited by Michael Loyd Chadwick.

2. I express special appreciation to Professor Worthen not only for his assistance in the
research for this essay but also his willingness to act as a sounding-board for my ideas
and to review the first draft. But, what is an uncle for (if one can't rely on family, on
whom can one rely)?

